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Abstract
Bytecode veriﬁcation forms the corner stone of the Java security model that ensures the integrity
of the runtime environment even in the presence of untrusted code. Limited devices, like Java
smart cards, lack the necessary amount of memory to verify the type-safety of Java bytecode on
their own. Proof carrying code techniques compute, outside the device, tamper-proof certiﬁcates
which simplify bytecode veriﬁcation and pass them along with the code. Rose has developed such
an approach for a small subset of the Java bytecode language.
In this paper, we extend this approach to real world Java software and develop a precise model of
the memory requirements on the device. We use a variant of interval graphs to model liveness of
memory regions in the checking step. Based on this model, memory-optimal checking strategies
are computed outside the device and attached to the certiﬁcate.
The underlying type system of the bytecode veriﬁer has been augmented with multi-dimensional
arrays and recognizes references to uninitialized Java objects.
Our detailed measurements, based on real world Java libraries, demonstrate that the approach
oﬀers a substantial improvement in size of certiﬁcate over the similar approach taken by the KVM
veriﬁer. Worst case memory consumption on the device is examined as well and it turns out that
the reﬁnements based on our model save a signiﬁcant amount of memory.
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1 Introduction
Chip cards are used in many application domains where security is an impor-
tant issue. They serve as banking cards to access cash points, as subscriber
identity modules (SIMs) in mobile phones, or as cards of clients in the public
health system.
Java Cards are a special variant of Smart Cards equipped with a micro-
processor that runs a Java Card Virtual Machine to execute Java programs.
The platform independence of Java eases development of applications. Addi-
tionally, other Java concepts - like applet isolation and securely downloadable
code even after a card is issued - ﬁt the needs of the market.
Downloaded code may originate from untrusted sources or may be commu-
nicated over untrusted channels. Therefore, any Java Virtual Machine veriﬁes
that the code is safe before it is released for execution. This process is known
as bytecode veriﬁcation.
Type safety of program code is an essential issue. It has to be guaranteed
that every bytecode instruction operates always on program objects which
have the correct type, e.g. that arithmetic instructions do never operate on
object references because pointer arithmetic would compromise the security
of program execution.
Proofs of type safety require types of local variables and instruction operands
to be reconstructed. Unfortunately, data ﬂow analysis, the classical approach
to solve such problems, is too complex for the limited resources of Java Cards.
One of the suggestions to solve this challenge is based upon the general con-
cept of proof carrying code introduced by Necula [10]. Proof carrying code
deals with the same scenario of downloading code from an untrusted producer
over an untrusted channel to a consumer. This method can also be used to
relief the “code consuming” Java Card from the memory intensive data ﬂow
analysis.
Fig. 1. Proof Carrying Code adapted to Bytecode Veriﬁcation
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The proof carrying code scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. The producer
attaches a proof to the code according to some safety rules deﬁned by the
consumer.
Checking the attached proof against the code guarantees that the safety
rules hold, unless the check fails. Thereby, any tampering of the code or the
proof during creation or transport will be detected. Moreover, the consumer’s
check that a given proof is correct is usually much easier than generating the
proof which is done by the producer.
Rose adapted the concept of proof carrying code to achieve a new variant
of bytecode veriﬁcation [13] as illustrated in Figure 1. Type safety of Java’s
intermediate bytecode is regarded as the safety rules of the PCC method. The
proof is the result of a data ﬂow analysis. The Java Card acts as the consumer.
It uses the certiﬁcate as an oracle which can predict the ﬁnal result of the data
ﬂow analysis whenever needed. This way, the check of the type safety can be
done eﬃciently in a single pass.
Rose showed in her master thesis [13] for a non trivial subset of the Java
language that the above approach is tamper proof. We have developed a
precise model of the temporary memory requirements of the approach. This
model leads to an eﬃcient implementation and reveals new optimization pos-
siblities. Furthermore, we have implemented a prototype that supports the
full Java language and we have performed experimental measurements on real
world software. The results show that the minimization of the temporary
memory requirements is crucial for the approach and that the optimized vari-
ant becomes viable for today’s Java Cards.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we concentrate
on the fundamental extensions of the Rose approach and our new technique
for memory optimizations. Then we present the results of our evaluation.
The section on related work focuses on alternative approaches to bytecode
veriﬁcation in resource-constrained environments.
2 Reﬁned Veriﬁcation Methods
We extended the approach suggested by Rose in three ways to be able to cope
with the full instruction set of Java Bytecode.
The most challenging extension is the support for multi-branches because
they inﬂuence the memory requirements of the veriﬁcation signiﬁcantly. We
have developed an abstract model for the memory requirements of the ap-
proach. We use this model to improve the formulation of Rose’s veriﬁcation
algorithm and to obtain a memory-eﬃcient implementation.
We extended the type system of the veriﬁer, too. Arrays introduce larger
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extensions to the type system itself, while the special size of the data types
long and double inﬂuences the implementation of the veriﬁer slightly. In ad-
dition, we discriminate references to objects that have not been initialized yet
within our type system. This is an elegant way to solve a special veriﬁcation
task completely transparent to the veriﬁcation algorithm.
The instruction set of the Java Virtual Machine has a couple of instruction
groups like arithmetic integer instructions which have the same semantics at
the type level. Rose’s formal proofs require the deﬁnition of inference rules
for each instruction. To reduce the number of rules Rose restricts herself to
a few representative instruction like IADD and ISUB of an instruction group
only. Our prototype supports entire instruction groups.
In the following section we summarize brieﬂy how classic data ﬂow analysis
works and how Rose’s variant has been derived from the classical approach.
Then we describe our extensions in detail.
2.1 From DFA Veriﬁcation to Lightweight Veriﬁcation
The bytecode veriﬁcation solves the problem of type inference: regardless of
the ﬂow of control each instruction has to ﬁnd values of an appropriate type
on the operand stack or in the local variables.
To ease the discussion of the diﬀerent approaches we use a common termi-
nology:
Deﬁnition 2.1 A frame type is a type based representation of the state of
the method frame at a certain instruction.
The term frame type emphasizes the relationship to the method frame of
the method in question that holds the operand stack and the local variable
registers at runtime 4 .
The elementary operation is the manipulation of frame types by an in-
struction. It can be regarded as a type based simulation of the execution of
the instruction.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A type transfer function of an instruction maps a given frame
type to a frame type that characterizes the eﬀect of execution according to
the type based semantics of the instruction. Additionally, the type trans-
fer function states the preconditions that have to hold if the instruction is
executed.
4 “Method frame” is the Java term for the activation record of a method. We use the term
“local variable registers” to emphasize that we talk about the local variables in the method
frame of the virtual machine and not about local variables of the Java source language
K. Klohs, U. Kastens / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 132 (2005) 95–11198
The preconditions prevent the execution of instructions if their operands
do not have suitable types or if the execution would lead to a stack overﬂow
etc.
Finally, we discriminate diﬀerent kinds of frame types.
Deﬁnition 2.3 An input frame type is the input of the type transfer function
of an instruction; an output frame type characterizes the result of the transfer
function. Furthermore, we use the attribute initial to denote a frame type
of the ﬁrst pass of the data ﬂow analysis. Similarily, a ﬁnal frame types
correspond to the ﬁnal result of the data ﬂow analysis.
Input and output frame types correspond to the situation right before and
after an instruction while the ﬁnal input frame type denotes the type inference
result for an instruction. If all instructions can be executed on their ﬁnal input
frame type the program is type safe. Otherwise, the veriﬁcation fails.
2.1.1 Type Inference by Conventional Data Flow Analysis
Data ﬂow analysis solves a type inference problem by an algorithm that iter-
ates over the control ﬂow graph. A node of the control ﬂow graph represents
an instruction sequence of straight line code, i.e. code whose inner instructions
are not target of a branch nor themselves branches. Control ﬂow nodes are
connected by directed edges whenever may be a transfer of control between
the two instruction sequences.
The algorithm starts with the ﬁrst instruction of the method body; its
initial input frame type reﬂects the situation right after the invocation of a
method when the ﬁrst local variable registers of the method frame contain
the parameters and the operand stack is empty. The transfer function of the
instruction is applied to this initial input frame type and the initial output
frame type is propagated to all successor instructions. This step is successively
applied to all instructions whose input frame type has been changed, until a
ﬁxed point is reached. This process may require several iterations because
backward branches may propagate new information to instructions that have
already been processed.
The veriﬁcation within a control ﬂow node is straight forward because all
output frame types are identical with the input frame types of the successor
instruction. Hence, all frame types especially the output frame type of the last
instruction of the sequence can be computed directly from the input frame type
of the control ﬂow node. Consequently, the instruction sequence of a control
ﬂow node can be regarded as a “super instruction” with a complex transfer
function and we can focus on the input and output frame types of control ﬂow
nodes from now on.
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Multiple successors of a control ﬂow node and branches that target already
visited nodes complicate the type inference algorithm as depicted in Figure
2. Branches with multiple targets like the edges to the nodes C and D cause
Fig. 2. Propagation of a Result Frame Types along Backward and Multi-Branches
the change of several input frame types. As a consequence, all pending input
frame types have to be stored when the next one is processed.
The loop branch to the visited node A shows that an already computed
input frame type may change afterwards. Thus, the data ﬂow analysis requires
multiple iterations to reach the ﬁxed point and the veriﬁer has to keep all input
frame types in memory.
The memory required to store one frame type for every control ﬂow node
easily exceeds the RAM resources of a Java Card. Some of the more complex
methods have 30 local variable registers and about 100 control ﬂow nodes.
This leads to a memory requirement of 6 kBytes which is actually supplied
by the most powerful Java Cards only. Therefore the classical approach is
considered impractical for Java Cards.
2.1.2 Lightweight Veriﬁcation
Here the proof carrying code approach comes in: Rose [13] simpliﬁes the
algorithm by storing type information in an additional certiﬁcate whenever
the veriﬁer does not calculate the ﬁnal input frame type immediately during
the ﬁrst pass. This idea combines two essential aspects: First, the certiﬁcate
predicts information which would be computed by a classical veriﬁer during
the inspection of other control ﬂows later. Second, the certiﬁcate contains
entries only if the information of the initial input frame type diﬀers from the
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ﬁnal input frame type.
Figure 3 shows an example. The ﬁnal input frame type of B is derived
immediately by combining the actual output frame type of A and the diﬀer-
ence information stored in the certiﬁcate. The approach requires a single pass
Fig. 3. Computation of Frame Types with Certiﬁcate Entries
over the bytecodes only, because the ﬁnal result of the data ﬂow analysis, i.e.
the ﬁnal input frame type of the actual control ﬂow node, is always at hand.
An additional oﬀ-card phase determines the certiﬁcates by the classical
data ﬂow analysis without the resource restrictions of the Java Card. The
certiﬁcate that is transmitted to the card holds the pieces of information that
are essential to reconstruct the data ﬂow analysis result from a initial input
frame type computed by the veriﬁer. Usually, the certiﬁcate entries are empty
and a certiﬁcate ﬁts into about 100 Byte.
However, this simplicity comes at the cost that the correctness of the in-
formation in the certiﬁcate has to be checked: Every ﬁnal input frame type
has to comply with the ﬁnal output frame type of all predecessor nodes. The
merge process guarantees this condition for the direct successor node because
the diﬀerence information in the certiﬁcate can only produce a more restric-
tive ﬁnal input frame type. Additionally, the veriﬁer has to ensure that the
ﬁnal input frame types of all other successor nodes are more restrictive than
the actual ﬁnal output frame type, too. These ﬁnal input frame types have
either been computed already or they are computed later in the veriﬁcation
process. Thus, the veriﬁer has to store some frame types temporarily.
2.2 Runtime Memory Requirements of the Lightweight Veriﬁcation
In this section we reduce the problem of dealing with temporary frame types to
the classical graph problem of ﬁnding a minimal cut for a linear arrangement
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of graph nodes.
Such a reduction is well know from register allocation techniques: The
evaluation order of an expression can be modeled as a linear arrangement
of a directed acyclic graph whose nodes represent single operations. These
operation nodes are connected by a directed edge whenever the output value
of one operation is used by the other operation. As a consequence, these
intermediate values have to be stored in registers until their ﬁnal use. A cut
in the linear arrangement separates the nodes in treated and remaining ones
as depicted in Figure 4. Hence, the edges that cross a cut correspond to the
Fig. 4. A Cut in a Linear Arrangement of a Graph
number of intermediate values that are stored before the next operation is
executed and the cut with the maximum number of values determines the
register requirement for the given evaluation order.
The runtime memory requirements of the veriﬁer can be determined in
a similar way. The order in which the nodes of the control ﬂow graph are
considered during the veriﬁcation forms the linear arrangement.
A cut in the linear arrangement corresponds to a transition of the veriﬁer
from one control ﬂow node to the next. The nodes on the left hand side of
the cut have already been veriﬁed and the nodes on the right hand side still
remain.
Every edge in the control ﬂow graph causes a test for compliance because
the ﬁnal output frame type of the source node has to be checked against the
ﬁnal initial frame type of the target node. Such a check can be done as soon
as both frame types have been computed i.e. when their nodes have been
veriﬁed. Hence, a frame type has to be stored for every edge that crosses the
cut because then one of the participating nodes is not computed yet.
Figure 5 depicts the two situations: if a branch originates at a remaining
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Fig. 5. Control Flow Edges and Temporary Frame Types
control ﬂow node, the ﬁnal input frame type of the target node is stored for the
check. The situation is similar when a control ﬂow edge targets a remaining
node but the ﬁnal output frame type has to be stored then.
The orientation of the edges does not model dependency information like
in the register allocation model but determines only which kind of frame type
will be stored. Therefore, our model diﬀers slightly because there is no need
to arrange source nodes before target nodes.
Multi-branches like LOOKUP-switches and the fact that a node can be
target of multiple nodes complicate the model as depicted in Figure 6.
=⇒
Fig. 6. From Multi-Edges to Special Edges
Although node 1 is targeted by two edges that cross the cut it is only
necessary to store the ﬁnal input frame type of node 1. The two edges just
indicate that the frame type will be used twice. The problem is once more
similar for stored output frame types. If a node has multiple successors in
the sequence of unvisited node the output frame type is used for multiple
compliance tests.
To make the number of edges that cross a cut equal to the number of
stored frame types, we model edges that originate in a set of remaining nodes
or that target a set of remaining nodes by a special kind of edge as depicted
in Figure 6.
Finally, each temporary frame type and the corresponding compliance tests
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are represented by a single edge. This edge determines the lifetime of its
frame type. The frame type remains in memory as long as the edge crosses
the cut of the actual transition. The number of cut edges is the number
of simultaneously stored frame types of the actual transition. The cut with
the maximum number 5 of edges determines the memory consumption of the
whole veriﬁcation pass when frame types are stored just as long as they are
needed.
Our model shows another possibility to reduce the memory requirements
of the veriﬁcation now: the oﬀ-card phase can determine the linear arrange-
ment with the minimal cut if the on-card veriﬁer is able to deal with ﬂexible
veriﬁcation passes. Our evaluation in Section 3 shows the expected eﬀects.
2.3 Extensions of the Type System
A type system can be modeled as a lattice [6] over the partially ordered set T of
all types. The partial order deﬁnes the subtype relation on types. Additionally,
the relation LeastUpperBound : T × T → T determines the nearest common
super class of two types.
The veriﬁer uses the type lattice in two diﬀerent ways. First, it ensures that
the type transfer function is evaluated only if the precondition holds that the
actual input frame type contains subtypes of the operand types. Moreover,
the veriﬁer merges frame types by applying the LeastUpperBound relation
successively to all stack elements and local variables.
A new data type leads to two modiﬁcations: We insert the type in the
lattice and we formulate the transfer functions of the new instructions. The
introduction of long arithmetic types and arrays that are not covered by the
Rose’s sublanguage is straight forward.
More interestingly, we use the type system also to adress the veriﬁcation
of object initialization. This solution is elegant because it is completely trans-
parent to the checker algorithm and keeps the semantic description of all other
bytecode instructions unchanged.
On the bytecode level the creation of new objects is decomposed into two
distinct instructions. The NEW instruction allocates memory for the object
while its constructor is invoked later with the INVOKESPECIAL instruction.
The veriﬁer has to ensure that references to an uninitialized object are only
used in a very restricted way. For example, other method invocations than
constructor calls with INVOKESPECIAL are not allowed.
We solve this veriﬁcation aspect in a similar way like Freund [4]. We
5 We do not consider the fact that frame types may diﬀer in size, because we expect that
the optimal solution is the one with a minimal number of frame types in most cases.
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introduce new uninitialized types into the type system. These new types make
up a completely new part of the lattice which is not related to the original class
hierarchy. The veriﬁer will reject the code if uninitialized references are used
as operands of conventional instructions because the subtype checks fail. The
type transfer functions of the NEW and INVOKESPECIAL-instruction produce
and consume the uninitialized variants of types.
Fig. 7. Types for Uninitialized References
The conversion of uninitialized types into their initialized counterparts has
to convert all copies of an uninitialized reference. To ﬁnd these copies in the
actual input frame every NEW instruction produces an own type. These types
are distinguished by the oﬀset of the NEW instruction.
Figure 7 illustrates the resulting lattice for a method that contains two
NEW A instructions at the oﬀsets 10 and 22.
2.4 Comparison and Discussion
In the proof carrying code approach for Java bytecode veriﬁcation an oﬀ-card
analysis computes the result of the data ﬂow problem of type inference analy-
sis. A veriﬁer can prove the type safety of the program with this information
eﬃciently.
Our approach reveals two degrees of freedom in the combination of proof
carrying code and a data ﬂow analysis: the type system and the certiﬁcate
i.e. the information that is transfered to the checker.
Many subproblems of the veriﬁcation can be encoded in the type sys-
tem. However, this should not be overstressed in a resource-constraint en-
vironment: multiple subtyping introduced by interface types would lead to
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a large set-based type system and its much easier to augment the spare
INVOKEINTERFACE-instructions by a runtime check.
The approach taken by the Kilo Virtual Machine (KVM) transfers the en-
tire data ﬂow analysis result to the verifer. As a consequence all compliance
tests can be done on the ﬂy and no intermediate results are needed. In con-
trast, Rose’s approach minimizes the size of the certiﬁcate. It exploits that
the veriﬁer computes much data ﬂow information during the check anyway.
However, an implementation of Rose’s pseudo code algorithm would store in-
termediate results unnecessarily. Our model determines how long the checker
needs certain pieces of information and shows how the checking order can be
arranged to achieve a memory optimal pass.
This way, the minimal certiﬁcate approach ﬁnally outperforms the straight-
forward KVM approach.
3 Memory Requirements
We discuss the size of the certiﬁcate and the temporary memory requirements
of the on-card algorithm separately. In the ﬁrst subsection we compare Rose’s
certiﬁcates to certiﬁcates used by another approach based on the general proof
carrying code concept: The veriﬁer that is implemented in the Kilo Virtual
Machine (KVM) stores the ﬁnal input frame type of every control ﬂow node
in its certiﬁcates. With all ﬁnal input frame types at hand none has to be
additionally stored. Therefore, the size of the KVM certiﬁcates show the
overall memory requirements of this approach. In the second subsection we
investigate the expected additional memory consumption for variants of Rose’s
approach with diﬀerent storing strategies for temporary frame types.
We focus our investigations on the worst cases because they must remain
manageable within the few kilo bytes of memory in a Java Card. The average
case is usually not a challenge because between 40% and 60% of the analyzed
methods contain only a single control ﬂow node. We have analyzed the stan-
dard API supplied by the Java Card Development Kit, two packages of the
standard Java Runtime Library, and the jDFA data ﬂow analysis framework
on which our certiﬁer prototype is based.
3.1 Comparison between RR-Certiﬁcate and Full Certiﬁcates
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the largest certiﬁcates of the KVM
and of Rose’s veriﬁer. The sizes of the Rose certiﬁcates are derived from Dirk
Jansen’s prototype implementation of a certiﬁer [8]. We measure the size of
frame type by the maximum number of local variable registers of the method
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Fig. 8. KVM vs. Rose: Largest Certiﬁcate Sizes
and a factor of 2 for the encoding of a single type 6 . The size of the largest
certiﬁcate of Rose does not exceed 200 Bytes for all code styles. In contrast,
the estimated worst cases of the KVM certiﬁcates that range in several kilo
bytes impose severe challenges on a Java Card. This comparison shows the
impressive eﬀects of Rose’s minimization idea. Another observation is that
the Java Card API code has comparatively small KVM certiﬁcates.
3.2 Temporarily Stored Frame Types
We investigate the memory requirements of three diﬀerent implementation
variants of Rose’s approach. The RoseDirect variant implements the original
description canonically. The RosePass variant uses our analysis of the lifetime
of frame types. The OptPass variant additionally exploits that a pre-computed
ﬂexible visiting order of control ﬂow nodes can reduce the number of frame
types further.
The diagrams in Figure 9 show the estimated memory requirements for the
for coexisting ﬁnal input frame types (Imax), ﬁnal output frame types (Omax),
and the sum of both types. Every value shows the result of the method that
produced the worst case in the category.
The diﬀerent values for input and output frame types of the RoseDirect and
RosePass show the application of our lifetime model to the ﬁxed veriﬁcation
pass. All ﬁgures show a decrease in the number of input frame types because
we reuse the memory of input frame types that are no longer needed. In the
6 This is an upper bound because there are usually optimization possibilities for the en-
coding and the number of local variable registers in a frame type.
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Fig. 9. Worst Cases of the Maximal Memory Consumption
presence of multi-branches that arise from SWITCH-instructions the original
idea of propagating the output frame type to all successor nodes would lead
to copies of the same frame type. Again our model determines the lifetime of
every output frame type and stores it until its last use. The eﬀect is show by
the Java Card API where the number of result frame types of the worst case
decreases signiﬁcantly.
However, all RosePass worst cases suﬀer from a large number of output
frame types that arises from the depth ﬁrst traversal. The comparison to the
OptPass values show the expected eﬀects if an optimizer determines a ﬂexible
traversal in combination with our lifetime model. The worst case of the Java
Card API shows the most signiﬁcant improvement that arises from the early
choice of nodes with many predecessors like exception handlers.
Pre-computed lifetimes of frame types, a ﬂexible visiting order, and min-
imized certiﬁcate entries in combination lead to an acceptable memory con-
sumption for the veriﬁcation process even in the worst cases. We conclude,
that the KVM certiﬁcates contain a large number of redundant type informa-
tion that is reduced eﬀectively by the use of minimized certiﬁcates.
4 Related Work
Our work combines a couple of diﬀerent ideas and concepts: Proof Carrying
Code is applied to conduct lightweight bytecode veriﬁcation, and our model
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of memory consumption applies a variant of register allocation. Furthermore,
we solved the veriﬁcation of uninitialized references by using a specialized
extension of a type system. The following presentation of related work is
organized along these topics.
Proof-Carrying-Code: The concept of Proof-Carrying-Code was originally
applied to ensure the safety of user written extensions of operating system
kernels [11]. With the attached proof the kernel can easily ensure that
device drivers do not access certain memory areas.
SafeTSA [1] uses separate register planes for values of distinct types. Op-
erations implicitly retrieve their operands from register planes with values
of the expected types. The proof of type correctness is encoded in auxiliary
instructions that reinterpret types.
Lightweight Bytecode Veriﬁcation: Other approaches for a veriﬁcation
suitable for Java-Cards were suggested by Leroy [9], Deville [3], and Nac-
cache [12]. The KVM veriﬁer is speciﬁed in [2].
Leroy applies an oﬀ card transformation to the code. This transformation
guarantees that the whole method can be veriﬁed with one single frame type.
This frame type is determined on-card by an adapted data ﬂow analysis.
However, the transformation aﬀects the runtime behaviour of a method
because it increases the code size and the number of local variables slightly.
Deville’s and Grimaud’s idea is to conduct the classical data ﬂow analysis
on the card. They optimize the usage of memory by an eﬃcient type en-
coding and suggest a memory manangement that evades in the EEPROM
of the card whenever a veriﬁcation requires more memory.
Naccache suggests to reduce the memory consumption of the standard
veriﬁcation process by reusing memory on the stack and local variables
which are no longer alive. However, the eﬀects of the additional adminis-
tration overhead are not obvious, because the approach is not implemented.
Our evaluation in Section 3 compares the KVM approach and the one
of Rose. The KVM stores all ﬁnal input frame types rather than their
diﬀerences. The diﬀerences of the certiﬁcate size are signiﬁcant but the
algorithm itself is simpler because the veriﬁer can perform all checks against
the certiﬁcate immediately.
Register Allocation: We model the memory consumption of the veriﬁcation
process similar to a register allocation method based on interval graphs [7].
Both approaches determine a minimal cut in the linear arrangement of a
graph.
Calculation of Program Properties Based on Type Systems: There are
several approaches that use type systems for Java Bytecode veriﬁcation:
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Stata [14] suggested an extension of a type system which is dedicated to
the veriﬁcation of subroutines.
Grimaud deﬁned the intermediate language Facade [5] which can express
type safe programs only. In this approach incorrect programs do not only
produce conﬂicts in the type system, but the type system becomes a prop-
erty of the language itself.
Moreover, type systems are used for other program analyses as well. One
example is Volpano’s approach to ﬂow analysis [15].
5 Conclusion
Rose’s proof carrying code approach for bytecode veriﬁcation on limited de-
vices has served as the starting point of our research. Her approach relies
on certiﬁcates, which are computed outside the device. Rose has realized her
approach for a rather small subset of Java bytecode and has reported some
encouraging results concerning the size of the resulting certiﬁcates.
In this paper, we have extended Rose’s approach to real world Java pro-
grams. The two main additions have been extensions to the type system of the
veriﬁer and the investigation of the additional on-card memory requirements
that arise from the validation of the minimized certiﬁcate. The type system
has been augmented with multi-dimensional array types and with types that
represent references to Java objects not fully initialized yet. Concerning the
size of the intermediate results of the on-card veriﬁer we have developed a
realistic model of the actual memory requirements, which uses interval graphs
to express liveness of memory regions.
The certiﬁcates of several real world bodies of Java code do not exceed
200 bytes while the size of the larges KVM certiﬁcates ranges in kilo bytes.
However, memory usage on the device can be large, when Rose’s original
description is directly applied to store intermediate results, especially if multi-
way branches and exceptions are supported. Memory minimal strategies which
use our memory model reduce memory requirements by up to 80%.
All in all, our extended application of proof carrying code techniques puts
full Java bytecode veriﬁcation well within reach of today’s severely memory-
constrained Java smart cards.
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